Abstract. We show how to construct an ideal cipher with n-bit blocks and n-bit keys (i.e. a set of 2 n public n-bit permutations) from a small constant number of n-bit random public permutations. The construction that we consider is the single-key iterated Even-Mansour cipher, which encrypts a plaintext x ∈ {0, 1} n under a key k ∈ {0, 1} n by alternatively xoring the key k and applying independent random public n-bit permutations P1, . . . , Pr (this construction is also named a key-alternating cipher). We analyze this construction in the plain indifferentiability framework of Maurer, Renner, and Holenstein (TCC 2004), and show that twelve rounds are sufficient to achieve indifferentiability from an ideal cipher. We also show that four rounds are necessary by exhibiting attacks for three rounds or less.
Block Ciphers
Block ciphers are one of the most important classes of primitives in cryptography. They are mainly used to provide confidentiality and authenticity to communication channels or local data storage means, but also to construct hash functions and in other more advanced cryptographic tasks. Syntactically, a block cipher E with message space {0, 1} n and key space {0, 1} m is a mapping from {0, 1} m × {0, 1} n to {0, 1} n such that for each key k ∈ {0, 1} m , E(k, ·) is an (efficiently invertible) permutation. Block cipher designs (virtually all of which rely on the iteration of some key-dependent round function) can be roughly split into two families (with some rare exceptions such as IDEA):
1) Feistel networks [Fei73] and their generalizations, where the round function is given by (x, y) → (y, x ⊕ F (k i , y)), where x and y are the left and right n/2 bits of the state, and k i is the round key; prominent examples include DES, Blowfish, KASUMI, and Camellia for "classical" Feistel networks, and CAST-256 and MARS for generalized Feistel networks; 2) substitution-permutation networks (SPNs), where one round generally consists of the composition of a round-key addition, a non-linear mixing layer, and a linear diffusion layer; notable examples include AES, SAFER, CRYPTON, SERPENT, PRESENT, and LED.
At an even higher design level, SPNs can be described (by collapsing the non-linear mixing layer and the linear diffusion layer at i-th round into a single n-bit permutation P i ) as successive applications of round-key additions and permutations P i . Such a structure was named a key-alternating cipher by the designers of AES [DR01, DR02] . The traditional security notion for a block cipher is pseudorandomness, i.e. indistinguishability from a random permutation [LR86] : namely, no distinguisher with reasonable resources and having black-box access to a permutation (and also to its inverse in a more stringent variant of the security notion) should be able to distinguish whether it is interacting with the block cipher E(k, ·) for a randomly chosen key k, or with a truly random permutation. In an asymptotic and more theoretical language, a family of block ciphers indexed by a security parameter meeting this security notion is called a pseudorandom permutation (PRP), or a strong pseudorandom permutation (SPRP) when the distinguisher has also access to the inverse permutation. The classical example of a construction for which we have some provable security results with respect to indistinguishability is the Feistel network. Starting from the seminal Luby-Rackoff paper [LR88] which showed that the Feistel construction with three rounds yields a PRP when its round functions are pseudorandom [GGM86] , and followed by a paper by Patarin [Pat90] showing that four rounds yield a SPRP (which was stated in [LR88] without proof), a long series of works established refined results in the same vein, such as [Mau92, MP03, Vau03, Pat04] to name a few.
The Ideal Cipher Model
Though there are numerous examples where the standard pseudorandomness assumption is sufficient to prove (in a reductionist sense) the security of a cryptographic scheme (e.g. for building a symmetric encryption scheme [BDJR97] or a MAC scheme [BKR00] ), there are also some settings where it might not be strong enough to derive a security proof. Indeed, in some situations, the adversary has more abilities than merely querying in a black-box way an encryption/decryption oracle. For example, there are some cases where the attacker might have access to a more powerful "related-key" oracle [Bih94, BK03, AFPW11] , i.e. it can ask encryption and decryption queries for keys that are related (in some limited and attack-dependent way) to the main key of the system.
In some contexts, the adversary might even be able to know or choose the key during the attack. This is notably the case when considering hash functions built from a block cipher, which is an old and well-established design strategy [LM92, PGV93] . Consider for example the Davies-Meyer construction, which turns a n-bit block and m-bit key block cipher E into a (m + n)-to-n-bit compression function f (k x) = E(k, x) ⊕ x. An attacker trying to break the collision or pre-image resistance of this compression function is clearly in a more powerful position than a mere black-box distinguisher. In fact, the PRP assumption is provably not sufficient to show the security of the Davies-Meyer construction. More precisely, assuming that PRPs exist, then there exists a PRP such that the Davies-Meyer compression function obtained from it is insecure. For example, starting from a block cipher E (with key length equal to its block length) which is a PRP, one can modify it to a slightly different block cipherẼ such thatẼ(k, k) = k for any key k. This does not affect the PRP property, but this clearly makes the Davies-Meyer compression function based onẼ trivially vulnerable to pre-image and collision attacks. Even more disappointingly, Simon [Sim98] showed that there is no provably secure black-box construction of a collision resistant hash function family from a block cipher using only the standard PRP assumption.
Ideally, the ultimate security goal for a block cipher would be that it "behaves" as a random and independent permutation for each possible key. This naturally leads to the socalled ideal cipher model (ICM), the origin of which can be traced back to Shannon [Sha49] . In the ICM, a block cipher E with n-bit blocks and m-bit keys is drawn at random from the set of (2 n !) 2 m possible block ciphers of this form, and made available through oracle queries (for both encryption and decryption) to all parties (including the adversary). This is very similar in spirit to the random oracle model (ROM) [FS86, BR93] used to model a perfect hash function. To the best of our knowledge, this model was first formally used in a security proof by Winternitz [Win84] and later by Merkle [Mer89] to show respectively the pre-image and collision resistance of the Davies-Meyer compression function. The ICM became increasingly popular after Black et al. [BRS02] used it to extensively analyze the security of the PGV block cipher-based compression functions [PGV93] . Since then, the ICM has been used to prove the security of a variety of other block cipher-based hash functions [Hir04, Hir06, Ste07, LSS11, Men12] , of key length extension methods for block ciphers [KR96, Des00, BR06, GM09, GT12], of symmetric encryption schemes [JJV02] , and even of some public-key protocols such as signature schemes [Gra02] , ring signature schemes [RST01] , public-key encryption [Jon02] , and key exchange protocols [BPR00] . Despite these numerous successful applications, one must not lose from sight that the ICM only gives heuristic insurance just as the ROM [CGH98] . In particular, Black [Bla06] exhibited an (arguably artificial) block cipher-based hash function which is provably collision resistant in the ICM, but becomes insecure when the ideal cipher is instantiated with any concrete block cipher.
With the ICM at hand, the question now becomes: is it possible to argue that a given block cipher design is as close as possible to an ideal cipher? In the standard model, one immediately faces the problem that, unlike for pseudorandomness, it even seems hard to come with a satisfactory definition of what this formally means, without running into impossibility results (similarly to [CGH98] and [Bla06] ) following from the fact that a concrete block cipher has a short description, whereas an ideal cipher does not. This unfortunate state of affairs has not prevented cryptanalysts from disproving that a concrete block cipher behaves as an ideal cipher by exhibiting some non-random behavior, i.e. some non-trivial 3 relation between inputs and outputs of the block cipher that can be found faster than for an ideal cipher, in a setting where the key is random and given to the attacker (known-key attacks), or when the attacker can freely choose the key(s) (chosen-key attacks). A classical example is the complementation property of DES which, despite being often viewed as a "benign" undesirable property, implies that DES does not behave as an ideal cipher. For AES, no such non-random properties were known until Biryukov et al. [BKN09] showed that so-called q-multicollisions can be found faster for AES-256 than for an ideal cipher. Known-key and chosen-key attacks were first put forward as an important cryptanalysis goal by Knudsen ans Rijmen [KR07] , and have since then become an active area of research [MPP09, GP10, SY11].
Indifferentiability
Though we cannot hope to formalize (not to say prove) that a concrete block cipher behaves as an ideal cipher in any reasonable sense in the standard model, it is possible to obtain positive results in idealized models, i.e. by viewing some subcomponent of the block cipher as perfectly random. This perfect subcomponent is made available to all parties as a public oracle, which makes this setting formally distinct from classical indistinguishability. In order to assess whether a cryptographic construction based on an ideal subcomponent is secure, one has to employ the formalism of indifferentiability, introduced by Maurer et al. [MRH04] . A construction C (e.g. a block cipher), based on some ideal primitive F (e.g. a random permutation), is said to be indifferentiable from some target ideal primitive G (e.g. an ideal cipher) if there exists an efficient simulator S (with black-box access to the primitive G) such that the two systems (C F , F ) and (G, S G ) are indistinguishable. Informally, the goal of the simulator is to provide answers which are consistent with what a distinguisher can obtain from G, without deviating too much from the distribution of answers of F . An indifferentiability result can be interpreted as a way to make sure that the high-level design of the construction C has no structural defect. More importantly, a composition theorem [MRH04] asserts that if C F is indifferentiable from G, then any cryptosystem proved secure when used with G remains secure when used with C F , therefore allowing modular proofs of security in idealized models. 4 Soon after its introduction, Coron et al. [CDMP05] used the indifferentiability framework to revisit the design of a hash function from an ideal cipher: namely they showed that a number of variants of the Merkle-Damgård domain extension method [Dam89, Mer89] , used with an ideal cipher in Davies-Meyer mode, are indifferentiable from a random oracle. The converse direction, i.e. proving that it is possible to construct an ideal cipher from a random oracle, turned out to be harder to achieve. A first attempt to prove that the Feistel construction with public random round functions is indifferentiable from a random permutation (and hence from an ideal cipher by prepending the key to each input to the random round functions) was made by Coron et al. for six rounds [CPS08] , and later by Seurin for ten rounds [Seu09] , but serious flaws were found in both proofs [Kün09, HKT11] . The situation was corrected with a proof by 3 We stress that because of the lack of a rigorous definition, the meaning of non-trivial here is somehow subjective. 4 Care has to be taken with this composition result when the security definition for the cryptosystem puts some limitations on the adversary, such as an upper bound on its memory [RSS11, DGHM12] Holenstein et al. [HKT11] that the 14-round Feistel construction with public random round functions is indifferentiable from a random permutation. This must be contrasted with the classical Luby-Rackoff result stating that the 4-round Feistel construction with pseudorandom round functions yield a SPRP.
Our Contribution
The indifferentiability result for the Feistel construction mentioned above is fundamentally about how to obtain a random permutation from a random (function) oracle. The step to obtain an ideal cipher (i.e. an exponential number of independent permutations) is trivially achieved through domain separation of the underlying primitive (namely by prepending the key to each call to the random function oracles). However, it does not tell us anything about how the key should be concretely mixed into the state. In a departure from this approach, we ask the following question: given a small number of objects with n-bit inputs (e.g. nbit permutations P 1 , . . . , P r ), is there a way to "combine" them together with an m-bit key in order to obtain a construction which is close to an n-bit block and m-bit key ideal cipher, i.e. a set of 2 m independent permutations, without appealing to a trivial domain separation argument? This naturally prompts us to turn our attention towards the second class of designs, namely key-alternating ciphers. 5 More formally, we consider the construction of a block cipher with n-bit blocks and m-bit keys from r public n-bit permutations P 1 , . . . , P r defined as follows: derive (r + 1) n-bit round keys (k 0 , . . . , k r ) from a master key K through some key derivation function, and encrypt the plaintext x ∈ {0, 1} n by computing the ciphertext y defined as:
When r = 1 and two independent n-bit keys (k 0 , k 1 ) are used, so that the ciphertext is simply y = k 1 ⊕ P 1 (k 0 ⊕ x), one obtains the so-called Even-Mansour cipher [EM97] . When P 1 is modeled as a public random permutation (that the adversary can query in a black-box way), Even and Mansour [EM97] showed that the resulting block cipher is a SPRP, with security ensured up to O(2 n/2 ) distinguisher queries. The indistinguishability of the general construction for r > 1 with independent keys (k 0 , . . . , k r ) was later studied for two rounds by Bogdanov et al. [BKL + 12], for three rounds by Steinberger [Ste12] , and for any number r of rounds (with non-tight security bounds) by Lampe et al. [LPS12] . Unsurprisingly, the number of adversarial queries up to which the key-alternating cipher is indistinguishable from a random permutation increases with the number of rounds. Following [LPS12] , and to emphasize that we work in the random permutation model for P 1 , . . . , P r , we will use the naming r-round iterated Even-Mansour cipher to designate the idealized key-alternating cipher where the permutations P 1 , . . . , P r are public and perfectly random permutations oracles.
In this paper, we consider the iterated Even-Mansour cipher from the point of view of indifferentiability, and ask whether this construction is indifferentiable from an ideal cipher for a sufficient number of rounds when the permutations P 1 , . . . , P r are public and random. A first simple observation is that the construction with r + 1 independent n-bit keys (k 0 , . . . , k r ) (resulting in a total key space {0, 1} m = {0, 1} (r+1)n ) is never indifferentiable (for any r) from an ideal cipher with n-bit blocks and (r + 1)n-bit keys (this had already been informally observed by [BKL + 12]). In a sense, independent keys offer too much freedom to the attacker, enabling to easily find related-key relations. There are two possible approaches to solve this problem. The first one is to derive the round keys (k 0 , . . . , k r ) from the master key using some cryptographic function (modeled as a random oracle for the indifferentiability proof). This was considered in an earlier and independent work by Andreeva et al. [ABD + 13] (see Section 1.6 below for a discussion of their result). The second possibility (not relying on any cryptographic assumption about the key derivation function) is to "correlate" the round keys. This is the approach we adopt: namely, we consider the iterated Even-Mansour cipher where the n-bit round keys (k 0 , . . . , k r ) are obtained by applying efficiently invertible n-bit permutations (γ 0 , . . . γ r ) to the n-bit master key k (see Figure 1 on page 12). As will appear clearly in view of its proof, the fact that the master key length is equal to the block length is crucial for our result. To insist on this particular point, we call this construction the single-key iterated Even-Mansour cipher. Our main result is the following one.
Theorem. The 12-round single-key iterated Even-Mansour cipher with twelve independent random public n-bit permutations (P 1 , . . . , P 12 ) and any efficiently invertible (public) n-bit permutations (γ 0 , . . . , γ 12 ) for the key schedule is indifferentiable from an ideal cipher with n-bit blocks and n-bit keys.
In fact, the key derivation permutations γ i will not play any role in the proof, so that we will focus on the simple case where they are all equal to the identity. Additionally, we show that at least four rounds are necessary by describing attacks (using only a constant number of queries) for three rounds or less.
Together with the result of [ABD + 13] discussed below, our main theorem validates the design strategy underlying SPNs and more generally key-alternating ciphers as a sound way to ensure security beyond pseudorandomness: it (theoretically) enables to achieve resistance against related-key, known-key and chosen-key attacks (that an ideal cipher can withstand). We stress that our result cannot be used as is to take concrete design decisions: first, our bounds (as is often the case with indifferentiability results) are extremely loose. 6 More importantly, the permutations P i used in concrete block ciphers such as AES are often too simple to be deemed close to random permutations (not to say independent: they are often the same).
Our Techniques
The techniques used to prove our main theorem are very similar to the ones introduced in [CPS08, Seu09, HKT11] for the Feistel construction (while the formalism we adopt is very close to [HKT11] ). We simply give a very cursory overview of the main ideas here (assuming all γ i 's are the identity). The simulator works by detecting and completing "partial chains" created by the queries of the distinguisher. Define the computation path for a plaintext x and a key k as the sequence of pairs (x 1 , y 1 ), . . . , (x 12 , y 12 ) of corresponding input and output values for the simulated permutations P 1 , . . . , P 12 . It must hold that the value y obtained through this computation path matches the value E(k, x) obtained from the ideal cipher, otherwise one could straightforwardly distinguish the "simulated" world from the "real" world. Hence, simply answering the distinguisher queries randomly will not work: the simulator must somehow "adapt" the computation path to match the ideal cipher E. Observe now the following important property of the single-key iterated Even-Mansour cipher: given only two consecutive values y i and x i+1 of the computation path (i.e. the output value of permutation P i and the input value to permutation P i+1 ), it is possible to deduce the corresponding key k = y i ⊕ x i+1 , and hence to move forward and backward along the path. Note that this property essentially relies on the fact that the master key length is equal to the block length of the permutations (would the master key be larger, then it could not be uniquely determined by y i and x i+1 ). Note also that this is the exact analogue of the property of the Feistel network that the input and output values to two consecutive round functions enable to uniquely move forward and backward inside the construction. With this in mind, the strategy of the simulator will be to detect partial chains in computation paths created by queries of the distinguisher to two consecutive permutations, and "complete" them by moving forward and backward inside the iterated Even-Mansour construction (randomly setting undefined permutation values encountered along the way, and making a call to the ideal cipher to "wrap around") until the input x and the output y for one particular permutation P are obtained (but still undefined inside P history). This permutation is then "adapted" by setting P (x ) := y so that the corresponding input and output for the simulated Even-Mansour cipher and for the ideal cipher match. A moment of thinking should make clear that the simulator cannot complete each and every partial chain created in its history, since this would create a "chain reaction" leading to an exponential running time and an exponential number of ideal cipher queries from the simulator. Hence, one must make a careful and parsimonious choice of "detection zones" for deciding which partial chains to complete. In addition, one must ensure that the simulator never overwrites an entry when adapting permutation P , thereby rendering a previously completed chain inconsistent. How exactly this is done is very similar to the case of the Feistel construction [Seu09, HKT11], and we refer to Section 4.1 for a more detailed overview.
As a retrospective afterthought, we note that the Feistel and the iterated Even-Mansour indifferentiability results are not that far apart: they both tell how to construct a "big object" (which in both cases has some specific syntactic constraints which are relevant only from a cryptographic perspective) taking 2n bits of input (the left and right n-bit halves of the input in the case of the Feistel network, and the key and the plaintext in the case of the iterated Even-Mansour cipher) from smaller objects with only n bits of input (fourteen n-bit to n-bit functions for the Feistel network, and twelve n-bit permutations for the iterated Even-Mansour cipher).
Related Work
In a prior and independent work [ABD + 13], Andreeva et al. proved a result which is close and complementary to ours: they showed that the iterated Even-Mansour construction with five rounds and a key derivation function modeled as a random oracle is indifferentiable from an ideal cipher. Though significantly reducing the number of rounds required for the proof to go through, and lifting the restriction that the master key length be equal to the block length of the permutations, their technique puts a strong burden on the key derivation function, which can hardly be seen as close to a random oracle in most concrete block ciphers. In fact, most key schedules, such as the one of AES, are "lightweight" and invertible, which makes our result (where the key derivation function has no cryptographic role) more relevant to practice.
Taken together, the two results indicate, not too surprisingly, that using a cryptographically strong key schedule, though not being necessary, enables to lower the number of rounds needed to obtain an ideal cipher (however this interpretation must be taken cautiously: it may well be that, say, the iterated Even-Mansour cipher with four rounds is indifferentiable from an ideal cipher, independently of the cryptographic strength of the key schedule).
Regarding the purely theoretical question of the minimal number of n-bit permutations needed to construct an n-bit block and n-bit key ideal cipher, the result of [ABD + 13] is better since it enables to use only six independent permutations (using a independent random permutation P 0 to build a key derivation function k → P 0 (k)⊕k which is indifferentiable from a random function).
Open Problems
The minimal number of rounds necessary in order for the single-key iterated Even-Mansour construction to achieve indifferentiability from an ideal cipher remains unclear. We know by our results of Section 3 that four rounds are necessary, and it may well be that this is also sufficient, but we think that substantially new techniques will be required to prove it (the situation is similar to the one of the Feistel construction: we know that six rounds are necessary in order to achieve indifferentiability from a random permutation [CPS08] , but currently the best number of rounds proved to achieve indifferentiability is fourteen [HKT11] ). In Appendix A, we make some observations about the obstacles that appear when trying to obtain a proof (with techniques similar to the ones used here) for the 8-round single-key iterated Even-Mansour construction.
As we already emphasized several times, our result crucially relies on the fact that the key length is equal to the block length of the cipher. An interesting open question (practically quite relevant to the understanding of the security of AES-256 and more generally of block ciphers with n-bit blocks and 2n-bit keys) is whether it is possible to come with a simple construction of a block cipher with 2n-bit keys based on a constant number of n-bit permutations which would be indifferentiable from an ideal cipher with n-bit blocks and 2n-bit keys, without using a cryptographically strong assumption about the key derivation function. 7 We note that cascading two 12-round iterated Even-Mansour constructions with two independent keys does not work (in fact one can easily see that cascading two ideal ciphers with two independent nbit keys is not indifferentiable from an ideal cipher with 2n-bit keys). Interleaving the xoring of two n-bit keys k 1 and k 2 in the iterated Even-Mansour construction (with sufficiently many rounds) seems a more promising approach (this is for example what is done for the block cipher LED-128 [GPPR11] which has 64-bit blocks and 128-bit keys). As an extremely preliminary analysis, we note that in this construction, pairs of inputs and outputs (x i , y i ), (x i+1 , y i+1 ), (x i+2 , y i+2 ) for three consecutive permutations P i , P i+1 , and P i+2 are sufficient to recover the two corresponding n-bit keys (say k 1 = y i ⊕ x i+1 and k 2 = y i+1 ⊕ x i+2 ), and hence uniquely specify the whole computation path inside the construction. Hence, a chain detection/completion strategy very similar to the one used in this paper might be able to work. It would require three detection rounds at the beginning, three detection rounds in the middle, and three detection rounds at the end of the cipher, plus two adaptation rounds, and four buffer rounds surrounding the adaptation rounds, amounting to a total of fifteen rounds.
Organization
We start with some preliminaries and important definitions in Section 2. In Section 3, we describe attacks in the indifferentiability setting against the iterated Even-Mansour cipher with independent keys (for any number of rounds), and against the single-key iterated EvenMansour cipher with three rounds or less. Finally, in Section 4, we prove that the single-key iterated Even-Mansour construction with twelve rounds is indifferentiable from an ideal cipher.
Preliminaries

Notation and Definitions
Given a finite non-empty set S, we write s ← $ S to mean that a value is sampled uniformly at random from S and assigned to s. The security parameter will be denoted n and will be identified with the block length of permutations in the Even-Mansour construction. We will write f ∈ poly(n) to denote a polynomially bounded function and f ∈ negl(n) to denote a negligible function. For δ ∈ {+, −}, we denoteδ the opposite of δ.
In the following, we will use calligraphic fonts (A, B, . . .) to denote interactive Turing machines, and typewriter fonts to denote Procedures attached to these machines. A distinguisher is an oracle Turing Machine D which takes as input a security parameter 1 n , has access to a set of oracles O 1 , . . . , O m , and outputs a bit b, an experiment we denote D O 1 ,...,Om = b. We will always consider distinguishers that are deterministic and computationally unbounded, and restricted only with respect to the number of oracle queries they make.
An ideal primitive is a probability distribution on some set of functions, and will be denoted with bold fonts. In the corresponding model, a function is drawn at random from the corresponding distribution (say F ) and all parties (say M) involved in the security experiment are given oracle access to the corresponding function, which we simply denote M F . In the following we will consider the following two ideal primitives: -a random permutation P i on {0, 1} n , which is a permutation drawn at random from the set of all permutations on {0, 1} n , and which can be accessed in the two directions P i (x) and P −1 i (y); we will use the notation P = (P 1 , . . . , P r ) to denote a tuple of independent random permutations; -an ideal cipher E with message space and key space {0, 1} n , which is drawn at random from the set of all block ciphers of this form, and which can be accessed in encryption, denoted E(k, x), and decryption, denoted E −1 (k, y).
Indifferentiability
We recall the usual definition of indifferentiability. 
C F is simply said to be statistically and strongly indifferentiable from G if for any q ∈ poly(n), the above definition is fulfilled with σ ∈ poly(n) and ε ∈ negl(n).
This definition does not refer to the running time of S and D. When only polynomial-time algorithms are considered, indifferentiability is said to be computational. Weak indifferentiability is defined as above, but the order of quantifiers for the distinguisher and the simulator are switched (for all distinguisher, there is a simulator. . . ).
In this paper, and similarly to [HKT11] , we will slightly tweak the definition of strong indifferentiability as follows: we will describe a simulator which, for any distinguisher D making a polynomial number of queries, runs in polynomial time and makes at most σ queries with overwhelming probability (rather than probability one) in system D G,S G . This is not a big concern since any such simulator S can be transformed into a simulator S for weak indifferentiability (which is sufficient for the composition theorem of [MRH04] to hold) which takes the maximal number of queries q of D as input, and aborts when its number of queries becomes larger than σ (computed as a function of q), hence making at most σ queries with probability one.
The Iterated Even-Mansour Cipher
Fix an integer r ≥ 1. Let P = (P 1 , . . . , P r ) be a tuple of permutations on {0, 1} n . The rround iterated Even-Mansour construction associated with P , denotedC P r , is the block cipher with message space {0, 1} n and key space ({0, 1} n ) r+1 which maps a message x and a key (k 0 , . . . , k r ) to the ciphertext defined by:
. . , γ r ) be a tuple of efficiently invertible permutations on {0, 1} n . The singlekey r-round iterated Even-Mansour construction associated with P and γ, denoted C P,γ r , is the block cipher with message space {0, 1} n and key space {0, 1} n which maps a message x and a key k to the ciphertext defined by (see Figure 1 ):
In all the following, we will focus on the case where all permutations γ i are the identity, and simply denote C P r the resulting cipher, namely:
. We stress that our main result (Theorem 2) holds for arbitrary permutations γ i as long as they are efficiently invertible.
Attacks
In this section we present attacks against the iterated Even-Mansour cipher with independent keys, and against the single-key iterated Even-Mansour cipher for three rounds or less. To describe the corresponding distinguisher, we generically denote (E, P ) the oracles to which it has access, where (E, P ) is either (C P r , P ) or (E, S E ). 
Attack on Independent Keys
We start with a simple attack againstC P r , i.e. the iterated Even-Mansour cipher where the r+1 round keys (k 0 , . . . , k r ) are independent, showing that this construction is not indifferentiable from an ideal cipher with (r + 1)n-bit keys. This had already been observed in [BKL + 12] (more precisely, the authors observed that there are trivial related-key attacks in this case).
Fix any non-zero constant c ∈ {0, 1} n . Consider the distinguisher D (E,P ) proceeding as follows:
(1) choose an arbitrary input x and an arbitrary key k 0 , and define x := x⊕c and
Note that this distinguisher does not make any query to P /S. Clearly, D always outputs 1 when interacting with (C P r , P ). On the other hand, when interacting with (E, S E ) for any simulator S, we see that the probability that E(k, x) = E(k , x ) is exactly 2 −n . Hence the distinguishing advantage of D is exactly 1 − 2 −n .
Attack on Three Rounds
Here, we show an attack on the single-key iterated Even-Mansour cipher with three rounds C P 3 , with P = (P 1 , P 2 , P 3 ), and (γ 0 , . . . , γ 3 ) = (Id, . . . , Id) for the key derivation. This can easily be simplified into attacks for one and two rounds. An attack applicable to arbitrary efficiently invertible permutations (γ 0 , . . . , γ 3 ) was independently described in [ABD + 13]. Our attack has the additional advantage that is enables to find a so-called evasive relation [CGH98, MPS12] on the inputs and outputs of the cipher. Consider the following distinguisher D (E,P ) (see also Figure 2 ):
(1) choose arbitrary values x 3 , k, k ∈ {0, 1} n , with k = k ; (2) compute y 2 := x 3 ⊕ k and y 2 := x 3 ⊕ k ; (3) query x 2 := P −1 2 (y 2 ) and x 2 := P −1 2 (y 2 ); (4) compute y 1 := x 2 ⊕ k and y 1 := x 2 ⊕ k ; (5) compute k := y 1 ⊕ x 2 and k := y 1 ⊕ x 2 ; (6) if k, k , k , and k are not pairwise distinct, output 0; (7) query x 1 := P −1 1 (y 1 ) and (9) query y :
This distinguisher implies the following theorem.
Theorem 1. The 3-round single-key iterated Even-Mansour cipher C P
3 using three independent random n-bit permutations (and (γ 0 , . . . , γ 3 ) = (Id, . . . , Id) for the key derivation) is not indifferentiable from an ideal cipher with n-bit blocks and n-bit keys.
Proof. We lower bound the distinguishing advantage of D. First, we show that D outputs 1 with overwhelming probability when interacting with (C P 3 , P ). As a first step, observe that
, and k are not pairwise distinct iff x 2 ⊕ x 2 = k ⊕ k , which happens with probability 1/(2 n − 1) since x 2 and x 2 are uniformly random distinct values. Hence D outputs 0 with probability at most 1/(2 n − 1) at step (6). We show now that conditioned on D not outputting 0 at step (6), it always outputs 1. For this, note that by definition of y 1 , y 1 , k , and k , we have:
Consider now the computation path inside the iterated Even-Mansour cipher for each input (k, x), (k , x ), (k , x ), and (k , x ). Clearly, the input to P 3 for both inputs (k, x) and (k , x ) is x 3 . The input to P 3 for (k , x ) and (k , x ) are respectively y 2 ⊕ k and y 2 ⊕ k . By definition of all intermediate values set by the distinguisher, we see that
Hence the input to P 3 for both inputs (k , x ) and (k , x ) is the common value x 3 := y 2 ⊕ k = y 2 ⊕ k . Hence, the four corresponding outputs are resp. y = y 3 ⊕ k, y = y 3 ⊕ k , y = y 3 ⊕ k , and y = y 3 ⊕ k , where y 3 = P 3 (x 3 ) and
Consider now what happens when D interacts with (E, S E ) for some efficient simulator S which makes at most σ queries when D makes at mostueries. Denote M the combination of D and S. Note that M is an oracle Turing machine which makes at most q = q + σ queries in total to E. Whenever D outputs 1, we see that M has successfully found four inputs (k, x), (k , x ), (k , x ) and (k , x ), where k, k , k , and k are pairwise distinct, which, together with their corresponding outputs y = E(k, x), y = E(k , x ), y = E(k , x ), and y = E(k , x ) satisfy:
Note that the first two conditions holds with probability 1 by construction of the distinguisher. It remains to show that M has only a negligible probability to find such values. Consider theueries of M to E sequentially, and denote Bad the event that such values can be found among theueries, and Bad i the event that such values can be found among the i first queries. We will upper bound Pr[Bad i |Bad i−1 ]. Consider the i-th query, and assume that this is an encryption query y i := E(k i , x i ) (the reasoning is similar for a decryption query). We can assume wlog that k i is distinct from all keys appearing in previous queries, so that y i is uniformly random. Then Bad i happens only if y i takes one of at most
≤ i 3 values, hence with probability at most i 3 /2 n . By summing over i, we see that Bad happens with probability at most
Since q is polynomial if S makes a polynomial number σ of queries, we see that D outputs 1 with negligible probability when interacting with (E, S E ). Hence D has advantage negligibly close to 1, which concludes the proof.
Indifferentiability for Twelve Rounds
In this section we prove the main result of this paper, which is the following theorem.
Theorem 2. For any q, the 12-round single-key iterated Even-Mansour cipher C P ,γ 12
with twelve independent random n-bit permutations P = (P 1 , . . . , P 12 ), and fixed, efficiently invertible n-bit permutations γ = (γ 0 , . . . , γ 12 ) for the key schedule, is strongly and statistically (q, σ, ε)-indifferentiable from an ideal cipher E with n-bit blocks and n-bit keys, where:
To prove this, we will describe an efficient simulator S, and show that the two systems (C P ,γ 12 , P ) and (E, S E ) are indistinguishable. For simplicity we focus on the case where all γ i 's are the identity, but the generalization is straightforward.
Notational convention.
In all this section, we will use the following useful notational convention: we will interchangeably denote the input to the ideal cipher or the iterated Even-Mansour cipher x or y 0 , and the output y or x 13 .
Informal Description of the Simulator
We start with a high-level view of the simulator (see also Figure 3 ). It offers an interface to the distinguisher for querying the simulated permutations, which formally takes the form of a public procedure Query(i, δ, z), where i ∈ {1, . . . , 12} names the permutation, δ ∈ {+, −} tells whether this is a direct or indirect query, and z ∈ {0, 1} n is the actual value queried. The simulator maintains an history for the simulated permutations under the form of hash tables P 1 , . . . , P 12 . Each such table maps entries (δ, z) ∈ {+, −} × {0, 1} n to values z ∈ {0, 1} n .
We denote P + i , resp. P − i , the (time-dependent) sets of strings z ∈ {0, 1} n such that P i (+, z), resp. P i (−, z), is defined. When the simulator receives a query (i, δ, z), it looks in hash table P i to see whether the corresponding answer P i (δ, z) is already defined. When this is the case, it outputs the answer and waits for the next query. Otherwise, it draws a uniformly random answer z and defines in hash table P i (δ, z) := z , as well as the answer to the opposite query P i (δ, z ) := z (note that this last assignment may overwrite an entry in P i ).
Additionally, before outputting the answer z , and for some specific values of (i, δ), the simulator triggers a chain detection mechanism followed by a chain completion mechanism to ensure consistency of its answers with the ideal cipher E. An essential point to notice about the iterated Even-Mansour cipher in order to understand these mechanisms is that given an output value y i for permutation P i and an input value x i+1 for permutation P i+1 , it is possible to compute the corresponding key k = y i ⊕ x i+1 , and therefore to move forward and backward in the construction up and down to the corresponding input x and output y to the cipher. Hence, any tuple (y i , x i+1 , i) (a so-called partial chain later in the reasoning) defines a unique computation path inside the whole construction. This is the exact analogue of the property of the Feistel construction that the input values to two consecutive round functions uniquely define the computation path inside the Feistel network.
There are exactly six such values of (i, δ) for which the simulator performs additional steps: (2, +), (6, +), (6, −), (7, +), (7, −), and (11, −). The cases (2, +) and (11, −) are similar. When receiving a query (2, +, x 2 ) for which the answer is undefined yet, the simulator, after having drawn a random answer y 2 to this query, considers all values y 1 ∈ P − 1 , computes the corresponding key k := y 1 ⊕ x 2 , and moves backward in the iterated Even-Mansour cipher by computing x 1 := P 1 (−, y 1 ), y 0 := x 1 ⊕ k, x 13 := E(k, y 0 ) (hence making a query to the ideal cipher), and y 12 := x 13 ⊕ k, and checks whether y 12 ∈ P − 12 . When this is the case, it enqueues in a queue Queue the tuple (y 0 , x 1 , 0, 4). The first three elements (y 0 , x 1 , 0) specify the partial chain that must be completed, while the last element = 4 specifies which permutation will be adapted during completion of the chain to ensure consistency with E. The behavior of the simulator when receiving a query (11, −, y 11 ) is symmetric: after having drawn a random answer x 11 , for all x 12 ∈ P + 12 , it moves forward in the iterated Even-Mansour cipher to check whether the corresponding value x 1 is in P + 1 , and if so enqueues the corresponding tuple (y 0 , x 1 , 0, 9) (note that in this case adaptation will take place at permutation P 9 ).
The four remaining cases (i, δ) = (6, +), (6, −), (7, +), and (7, −) are similar, except that there is no check: the simulator enqueues a tuple (y 6 , x 7 , 6, ) for each newly generated pair (y 6 , x 7 ) ∈ P − 6 × P + 7 . If this was a query with i = 6, then adaptation will take place at = 4, while if this was a query with i = 7, adaptation will take place at = 9. Assume for a concrete example that the simulator receives a query (6, +, x 6 ) whose answer is undefined yet. Then it draws a random answer y 6 ← $ {0, 1} n , and enqueues (y 6 , x 7 , 6, 4) for all x 7 ∈ P + 7 . Immediately after having enqueued newly created chains (y i , x i+1 , i, ), the simulator starts completing the partial chains, by dequeuing tuples from Queue. For this, when dequeuing (y i , x i+1 , i, ), it computes the key k := y i ⊕ x i+1 , and moves forward and backward in the iterated Even-Mansour cipher, possibly defining missing permutations values P i (+, ·) or P i (−, ·), and making a query to E(k, ·) to "wrap around", until it reaches the input value x for P (when moving forward) and the corresponding output y (when moving backward). It finally "adapts" permutation P by setting P (+, x ) := y and P (−, y ) := x in order to ensure consistency of the entire chain with E. It also adds chains that have been completed in a set Completed in order to avoid completing them twice. While completing a chain and adding possibly missing permutation values, the simulator uses the same chain detection mechanism as when receiving a direct query from the distinguisher. Hence new tuples may be enqueued while dequeuing and completing a chain, and the simulator keeps dequeuing tuples until the queue is empty. When this is the case, it returns the answer to the original query of the distinguisher.
As in the indifferentiability proof of the Feistel construction, there will be two crucial points to show: first, that the recursive chain completion mechanism terminates in polynomial time (except maybe with negligible probability); second, that the simulator can always adapt, i.e. that it never has (or only with negligible probability) to overwrite previously defined entries when adapting a chain, which would render previously completed chains inconsistent with the ideal cipher E. Permutations P 3 , P 5 , P 8 , and P 10 (i.e. the permutations surrounding the two adaptation rounds P 4 and P 9 ) will play a key role while proving this last point: they will ensure that no bad collisions occur at the input or output of the two permutations used for adapting chains.
Formal Description of the Simulator
We now give a formal description of the simulator S in pseudocode. We will use the following notations. The simulator maintains hash tables P 1 , . . . , P 12 which are initially empty. Any such hash table contains entries (δ, z) ∈ {+, −} × {0, 1} n associated with values z ∈ {0, 1} n . We will note (δ, z) ∈ P i to mean that entry (δ, z) is in the hash table, and denote P i (δ, z) the associated value. For δ ∈ {+, −} we will denote P δ i the set of values z ∈ {0, 1} n such that (δ, z) ∈ P i . We say that P i defines a partial permutation on {0, 1} n (at some point during the execution) if for all x, y ∈ {0, 1} n , (+, x) ∈ P i and P i (+, x) = y if and only if (−, y) ∈ P i and P i (−, y) = x. We warn that hash tables P i will not necessarily define partial permutations at any time during the simulation. Nevertheless, a large part of the indifferentiability proof will be to show that this holds with overwhelming probability. 8 Later in the proof, we will consider a slightly different simulator T (ϕ), whose differences with S are captured by framed statements, which can be ignored for the moment. 
Simulator S:
Simulator T (ϕ): The simulator offers one public interface Query accessible by the distinguisher for simulating the permutations. It can be queried with a tuple (i, δ, z) where i ∈ {1, . . . , 12} names the permutation, δ ∈ {+, −} tells whether this is a direct or indirect query, and z ∈ {0, 1} n is the actual value queried. This procedure first calls InQuery (a procedure described later which internally draws a random answer if needed, and fills the queue with newly created chains), and then completes the chains in Queue. 6 public procedure Query(i, δ, z): 
Procedure Adapt describes more specifically what happens around adaptations rounds = 4 or = 9. Describing this as an independent procedure will ease the discussion during the proof.
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private procedure Adapt(y −2 , x −1 , y +1 , x +2 , ):
Procedure ForceVal is used to force the value of permutation P for a given input/output pair (x , y ). A key point in the indifferentiability proof will be to show that entries are never overwritten in P when this procedure is called. Procedure InQuery internally draws a random value when the answer to a query is undefined, and then calls procedure EnqueueNewChains. 
if (i, δ) ∈ {(2, +), (6, +), (6, −), (7, +), (7, −), (11, −)} then
37
EnqueueNewChains(i, δ, z)
Procedure EnqueueNewChains enqueues newly created chains (if any) for specific values of (i, δ). Queue.Enqueue(y 6 , x 7 , 6, 9)
EvalForward(y i , x i+1 , i, ) is a procedure which evaluates the Even-Mansour construction forward for a pair (y i , x i+1 ) and returns the pair (y −1 , x ), where x j is the input to permutation P j for j ∈ {1, . . . 12} and x 13 is the output of the Even-Mansour construction, and y j is the output of permutation P j for j ∈ {1, . . . 12} and y 0 is the input to the Even-Mansour construction. Similarly EvalBackward(y i , x i+1 , i, ) is a procedure which evaluates the EvenMansour construction backward for a pair (y i , x i+1 ) and returns the pair (y , x +1 ). 12 using efficiently invertible permutations γ i for key derivation as defined in Section 2.3, the simulator can easily be modified as follows: each time the simulator computes a key as k := y i ⊕x i+1 , we replace the corresponding line with k := γ
When the same key is used to move forward or backward in the construction, the corresponding round keys can then be derived by the simulator as k j := γ j (k) for the adequate indexes j.
Intermediate Systems
Denote Σ 1 the system (E, S E ) and Σ 4 the system (C P 12 , P ). We introduce two intermediate systems Σ 2 and Σ 3 that we describe below. See also Figure 4 for a pictorial representation of all systems.
Second System
In system Σ 2 (η, ϕ) = (F(η), T (ϕ) F (η) ), the simulator S is replaced by a slightly different one denoted T (ϕ) and whose differences with S are captured by framed statements in the pseudocode of Section 4.2, and the ideal cipher E is replaced by what we call a two-sided keyed random function F(η). We now explain the differences between the two systems. First, the randomness in Σ 2 is made explicit through tables ϕ = (ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ 12 ) used by T and η used by F. Each table ϕ i maps entries (δ, z) ∈ {+, −} × {0, 1} n to uniform and independent values in {0, 1} n , while η maps entries (δ, k, z) ∈ {+, −} × {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n to uniform and independent values in {0, 1} n . Whenever S sets a value P i (δ, z) randomly at line 33, T uses the value ϕ i (δ, z) instead (note that this is just a syntactic modification which does not change the distribution of the answers of the simulator).
F offers the usual interfaces of an ideal cipher which will be denoted F.Enc(·, ·) and F.Dec(·, ·), taking a key k and a value z ∈ {0, 1} n as input and returning a value z ∈ {0, 1} n , and an additional procedure F.Check (only queried by the simulator during the experiment). F is defined by the pseudocode given below. It uses a hash table E which contains entries (δ, k, z) ∈ {+, −} × {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n associated with values z ∈ {0, 1} n . We note (δ, to mean that entry (δ, k, z) is in the hash table and denote E(δ, k, z) the associated value. For δ ∈ {+, −}, we denote E δ the set of values (k, z) such that (δ, k, z) ∈ E. We say that E defines a partial cipher (at some point during the execution) if for all k, x, y ∈ {0, 1} n , (+, k, x) ∈ E and E(+, k, x) = y if and only if (−, k, y) ∈ E and E(−, k, y) = x. We warn that E will not necessarily define a partial cipher at any time during the execution, however we will show that this holds with overwhelming probability. 
Third System
In system Σ 3 (π) = ( C 12 (π), T (π) C 12 (π) ), we make the following changes. We introduce tables π = (π 1 , . . . , π 12 ) which are uniformly random permutation tables, meaning that π i (+, x) = y if and only if π i (−, y) = x. The two-sided keyed random function F is replaced by an EvenMansour construction C 12 (π) defined by the pseudocode given below (note that this is simply the usual Even-Mansour construction associated with the tuple of permutations π, enhanced with a Check procedure). Also, the simulator T now uses the same tables π i instead of uniform tables ϕ i . 
return false
Stages of the Indifferentiability Proof
In order to prove our indifferentiability result, we fix a deterministic, computationally unbounded distinguisher D issuing at mostueries in total, and prove the following three inequalities:
where the probabilities are over the random coins of S and the random draw of E in Σ 1 , over the random draw of (η, ϕ) in Σ 2 (note that D, T , and F are all deterministic), over the random draw of π in Σ 3 , and over the random draw of P in Σ 4 . Additionally, we will show (Lemma 6) that the simulator S runs in polynomial time with overwhelming probability in system Σ 1 . Combining these lemmas will yield Theorem 2, that we restate here for convenience.
Theorem. For any q, the 12-round single-key iterated Even-Mansour cipher C P ,γ
12 with twelve independent random n-bit permutations P = (P 1 , . . . , P 12 ), and fixed, efficiently invertible n-bit permutations γ = (γ 0 , . . . , γ 12 ) for the key schedule, is strongly and statistically (q, σ, ε)-indifferentiable from an ideal cipher E with n-bit blocks and n-bit keys, where:
Proof. This follows directly from Lemmas 5, 6, 23, and 24 which will be proven in the remaining of the paper.
Complexity of the Simulator in the Second System
In this section, we show that the simulator T runs in polynomial time with probability 1 in system Σ 2 . This will imply that S runs in polynomial time with overwhelming probability in system Σ 1 as we will show later. First, we prove that if the simulator T ever completes a partial chain (y 0 , x 1 , 0), then the distinguisher must have made a corresponding call to F.Enc or F.Dec. Proof. First, note that if the same chain (y 0 , x 1 , 0) is enqueued twice or more, it will be dequeued only once since it is put into Completed once it has been completed the first time. Let (y 0 , x 1 , 0) and (y 0 , x 1 , 0) be two distinct partial chains dequeued at some point in the execution such that (y 0 , x 1 , 0) / ∈ Completed and (y 0 , x 1 , 0) / ∈ Completed when they are dequeued. Let also Check(k, y 0 , x 13 ) and Check(k , y 0 , x 13 ) be the respective corresponding calls at line 46 or 53 of T which returned true and led to these chains being enqueued. Then k = y 0 ⊕ x 1 and k = y 0 ⊕ x 1 , so that these calls were necessarily for distinct triples of inputs. Hence, for each chain (y 0 , x 1 , 0, ) which is dequeued at some point in the execution such that (y 0 , x 1 , 0) / ∈ Completed when it is dequeued, we can find a distinct 3-tuple (k, x, y) for which Check(k, x, y) was true at the moment (y 0 , x 1 , 0, ) was enqueued. We can now find a unique access to η during a call to F.Enc or F.Dec which corresponds to (k, x, y): either y := η(+, k, x) if this was a query to F.Enc, or x := η(−, k, y) if this was a query to F.Dec. This query to F.Enc or F.Dec was made either by the distinguisher or the simulator. We argue that this call cannot have been made by the simulator. The simulator issues such queries only when it completes a chain, and after this completion, it adds (y 0 , x 1 , 0) to Completed, and so it cannot have been that (y 0 , x 1 , 0) / ∈ Completed when it was dequeued. Thus, there is a distinct query of the distinguisher associated with each dequeue call of the form (y 0 , x 1 , 0, ) for which (y 0 , x 1 , 0) / ∈ Completed, so there are at most q such dequeue calls. | are at most 2q. Pairs of assignments in P 6 or P 7 can only happen in two cases: either when the distinguisher makes a query to T .Query(i, δ, z) with i = 6 or 7, or when the simulator completes a chain (y 0 , x 1 , 0, ). There can be at most q calls to T .Query by the distinguisher, and according to Lemma 1, there are at most q chains of the form (y 0 , x 1 , 0, ) which are completed, which implies the bound. This directly implies that the simulator completes at most |P − 6 | · |P + 7 | ≤ 4q 2 chains of the form (y 6 , x 7 , 6, ).
Lemma 2. Consider an execution of
For any i ∈ {1, . . . , 12}, the size of P + i and P − i can only be enlarged by at most 1 in the following cases: if the distinguisher calls T .Query(i, δ, z), if a chain of the form (y 0 , x 1 , 0, ) is completed, or if a chain (y 6 , x 7 , 6, ) is completed. There are at most q events of the first kind, at most q events of the second kind by Lemma 1, and at most 4q 2 events of the last kind, giving a total of 4q 2 + 2q ≤ 6q 2 possibilities.
The simulator queries F.Enc or F.Dec only when it completes a chain. Hence the total number of queries to F.Enc or F.Dec made by the simulator is at most q + 4q 2 ≤ 5q 2 . Consequently the total number of queries to F.Enc or F.Dec made either by the distinguisher or the simulator is at most q + 5q 2 ≤ 6q 2 . Since the size of E + and E − is enlarged at most by 1 by each query, one has that |E + | and |E − | are at most 6q 2 . Finally, the number of queries to F.Check made by the simulator is bounded by |P 
From the First to the Second System
We show that systems Σ 1 and Σ 2 are indistinguishable. For this, we first recall a result from [HKT11] . Consider the following two systems:
-an n-bit two-sided random function R, which is defined exactly as the two-sided keyed random function F, with a key space of size one (the key is therefore omitted from the inputs to R) -an n-bit random permutation P , enhanced with a procedure Check(x, y) which returns true if and only if P (x) = y.
Then the following result states that these two systems are indistinguishable.
Lemma 3 (Lemma 3.2 of [HKT11]). A distinguisher which issues at most q queries to either a random permutation P enhanced with a procedure Check as described above or a two-sided random function R has advantage at most
2 n in distinguishing the two systems.
The following lemma is simply a "keyed" version of Lemma 3.
Lemma 4. Let E denote an ideal cipher enhanced with a procedure Check(k, x, y) which returns true if and only if E(k, x) = y. Then a distinguisher which issues at most q queries to either E or a two-sided keyed random function F has advantage at most
Proof. We only sketch how to adapt the proof of Lemma 3 given in [HKT11] . Their analysis is based on the definition of bad events such that if these bad events do not occur, the two systems P and R behave identically. The probability of these bad events is then upper bounded by 6q 2 /2 n . In order to adapt the proof to our case, one can define the same bad events for each key k i queried by the distinguisher. The probability that one of these bad events happens is then upper bounded by the sum over the keys queried by the distinguisher of 6(q i ) 2 /2 n , where q i is the number of queries corresponding to key k i . The result then follows from 6(q i ) 2 /2 n ≤ 6( q i ) 2 /2 n ≤ 6q 2 /2 n .
Lemma 5. For any distinguisher D which makes at most q queries in total, we have:
Proof. Consider the following simple modification to the simulator T : whenever T is about dequeuing a (q+1)-th partial chain of the form (y 0 , x 1 , 0, ) for which (y 0 , x 1 , 0) / ∈ Completed, it aborts instead. Clearly Lemmas 1 and 2 still hold for this modified simulator. Assume now that in Σ 2 we replace F(η) with an ideal cipher E enhanced with a Check procedure, and denote Σ 1 the resulting system. Then the combination of D and T can be seen as a single distinguisher D interacting either with an ideal cipher E enhanced with a Check procedure for Σ 1 , or with a two-sided keyed random function F(η) for Σ 2 . Moreover, by Lemma 2, this distinguisher D makes at most q + 5q 2 + 2 × 6 3 × q 6 ≤ 2 9 × q 6 queries to either E or F. We can then use Lemma 4 with q = 2 9 × q 6 to get:
Moreover, this implies that T aborts with probability at most 2 21 q 12 /2 n is Σ 1 since otherwise one would obtain a distinguisher contradicting the bound above (recall that T never aborts in Σ 2 by Lemma 1). Observe now that the only differences between Σ 1 and Σ 1 are the following ones:
-T queries ϕ whereas S draws random values by itself (but this does not change the distribution of the answers of the system); -T queries F.Check whereas S queries E or E −1 and performs the check by itself (but again this does not change the distribution of the answers of the system); -T may abort while S does not.
Hence we see that unless T aborts in Σ 1 , the two systems behave identically, so that:
The results follows by combining the two inequalities above.
As a side result, we obtain that the simulator S runs in polynomial time in system Σ 1 with overwhelming probability.
Lemma 6. Assume that the distinguisher D makes at most q queries in total.
Then with probability greater than 1 − 2 21 × q 12 /2 n over an execution of D Σ 1 , the simulator S makes at most 2 7 × q 4 queries to E or E −1 (assuming S never repeats a query).
Proof. We showed in the proof of Lemma 5 that T aborts over an execution of D Σ 1 with probability at most 2 21 q 12 /2 n . This directly implies that with probability at most 2 21 q 12 /2 n over an execution of D Σ 1 , S dequeues at most q times a partial chain of the form (y 0 , x 1 , 0, ) for which (y 0 , x 1 , 0) / ∈ Completed. Whenever this holds, this implies as in the proof of Lemma 2 that the size of P 
From the Second to the Third System
This section contains the heart of the proof, and is largely devoted to the analysis of the second system: we first give some definitions about so-called partial chains in Σ 2 (η, ϕ) (Section 4.7.1), then we define a bad event that may happen in Σ 2 (η, ϕ) and show that it occurs only with negligible probability (Section 4.7.2), and then we show that for executions such that this bad event does not happen, the simulator T never overwrites entries during a call to ForceVal (Section 4.7.3). Finally, Section 4.7.4 contains a "randomness mapping" argument (similar to the one of [HKT11] ) enabling to precisely compare executions of D Σ 2 (η,ϕ) and D Σ 3 (π) .
Partial Chains
A partial chain C is a tuple (y i , x i+1 , i) where y i , x i+1 ∈ {0, 1} n and i ∈ {0, . . . , 12}. The key associated with C = (y i , x i+1 , i) is k = y i ⊕ x i+1 . Note that partial chains (y 0 , x 1 , 0) and (y 12 , x 13 , 12) are special: y 0 (resp. x 13 ) correspond to the direct input (resp. indirect input) to the iterated Even-Mansour cipher.
Fix hash tables P 1 , . . . , P 12 , and E at some point in the execution of
, and C[3] = i. We define below two functions next and prev, taking as input a partial chain C, and returning the partial chain obtained by moving respectively one step forward or backward in the iterated Even-Mansour cipher, or the special symbol ⊥ when this is not possible because some value is undefined in tables P i or E, as well as functions val + and val − , taking as input a partial chain C, and returning respectively the direct or inverse input to permutation P corresponding to C, or the special symbol ⊥ when it is undefined. Note that these are functions used for the reasoning, not procedures: they do not modify the tables. We will also need the following two important definitions. This relation is clearly always reflexive and transitive, but not necessarily symmetric (as we will see later, it is symmetric as long as no entry is overwritten in any table P i or E).
Definition 3. Consider tables P 1 , . . . , P 12 , and E at some point in the execution of
The following equivalences can be immediately checked: 13 , 12) is table-defined iff (−, y 12 ) ∈ P 12 and (−, k, x 13 ) ∈ E with k = y 12 ⊕ x 13 .
Bad Events in the Second System
In all the following, a pair of random forward assignments in table E refers to any A pair of random assignments in table E or P i refers indifferently to the forward or backward case. We define the history H for a pair of random assignments in E or in some P i as the set of all n-bit strings appearing in the tables E and P i just before the pair of assignments (more precisely, for any entry E(δ, k, z) = z , this includes k, z and z , while for any entry P i (δ, z i ) = z i this includes z i and z i ) as well as n-bit strings appearing in the query corresponding to the pair of assignments, namely the values k and x (resp. k and y) for a pair of random forward (resp. backward) assignments in E, or x i (resp. y i ) for a pair of random forward (resp. backward) assignments in P i .
We are now ready to define a bad event 10 that may happen during an execution of D Σ 2 (η,ϕ) , more precisely during a pair of random assignments in E or some table P i .
Definition 4. We say that event Bad happens if for a pair of random assignments in E or in some P i , the value freshly taken from η or ϕ i is equal to the bitwise xor of five or less values of the history H.
The probability of Bad can be easily upper bounded.
Lemma 7.
When D makes at mostueries, the probability (over the random choice of η and ϕ) that event Bad occurs in D Σ 2 (η,ϕ) satisfies:
Proof. By Lemma 2, we know that there are at most 6q 2 pairs of assignments in each tables E and P i during all the execution. Each pair of assignments in E adds at most three values in the history, while each pair of assignments in P i adds at most two values. Consequently, the size of the history is always at most 3 × 6q 2 + 12 × 2 × 6q 2 = 162 × q 2 . Hence, for any pair of random assignments in E or in some P i , event Bad happens with probability at most (162 · q 2 ) 5 /2 n . Since there are at most 13 × 6q 2 pairs of random assignments in E or in the P i 's in total, we obtain:
as claimed.
Definition 5. A pair (η, ϕ) is said good (with respect to some fixed distinguisher D) if event Bad does not occur during an execution of
Remark 2. In the more general case where efficiently invertible permutations (γ 0 , . . . , γ 12 ) are used for the key derivation, the bad event becomes more cumbersome to describe. However, the same bound as in Lemma 7 holds as well.
Properties of Good Executions
Our goal in this part is to show (this will be Lemma 17) that during an execution of D Σ 2 (η,ϕ) with a good pair (η, ϕ), the simulator T never overwrites values in tables P i during a call to ForceVal. We first state some basic properties of good pairs (η, ϕ) in Lemmas 8, 9, and 10 below. They are very similar to Lemmas 3.17, 3.20, 3.21, and 3.22 of [HKT11] , but note that our Lemmas 9 and 10 hold assuming that all calls to ForceVal were non-overwriting up to some point in the execution. Proof. To show (a), observe that for an entry to be overwritten during a pair of random assignments in E or in some P i , the value freshly taken from η or ϕ i must already be in the history H, contradicting the assumption that Bad does not happen.
We now show (b). Let C = (y i , x i+1 , i) be a partial chain, and assume that next(C) = ⊥ before a pair of random assignments in E or in some P i , and that C is table-defined and next(next(C)) = ⊥ after the pair of assignments. We distinguish two cases depending on i. Assume first that i = 12, so that C = (y 12 , x 13 , 12). Since next(C) = ⊥ before the pair of assignments and next(next(C)) = ⊥ after the pair of assignments, we see that it was necessarily a pair of assignments in E: either a pair of random forward assignments E(+, k, y 0 ) := x 13 , E(−, k, x 13 ) := y 0 , or a pair of random backward assignments E(−, k, x 13 ) := y 0 , E(+, k, y 0 ) := x 13 , with k = y 12 ⊕ x 13 . Moreover, since C is table-defined after the pair of assignments, we have that y 12 ∈ P − 12 before the pair of assignments. Hence, if this was a pair of random forward assignments, the value freshly taken from η was x 13 := η(+, k, y 0 ), and we see that x 13 = k ⊕ y 12 is the xor of two values of the history H, contradicting the assumption that Bad does not happen. If this was a pair of random backward assignments, then the value freshly taken from η was y 0 := η(−, k, x 13 ). Denote x 1 = y 0 ⊕ k, so that next(C) = (y 0 , x 1 , 0). Since by assumption next(next(C)) = ⊥, x 1 ∈ P + 1 even before the pair of random assignments. Hence we see that y 0 = x 1 ⊕ k is the xor of two values of the history H, contradicting the assumption that Bad does not happen.
Assume now that C = (y i , x i+1 , i) with i < 12. Since next(C) = ⊥ before the pair of assignments and next(next(C)) = ⊥ after the pair of assignments, we see that it was necessarily a pair of assignments in P i+1 : either a pair of random forward assignments P i+1 (+, x i+1 ) := y i+1 , P i+1 (−, y i+1 ) := x i+1 , or a pair of random backward assignments P i+1 (−, y i+1 ) := x i+1 , P i+1 (+, x i+1 ) := y i+1 . Moreover, since C is table-defined after the pair of assignments, we have that y i ∈ P − i before the pair of assignments. Denote k = y i ⊕ x i+1 , and x i+2 = y i+1 ⊕ k. Then next(C) = (y i+1 , x i+2 , i + 1), and since next(next(C)) = ⊥, we have x i+2 ∈ P + i+2 before the pair of assignments when i < 11, or (−, k, x 13 ) ∈ E before the pair of assignments when i = 11. Hence if this was a pair of random forward assignments, the value freshly taken from ϕ i+1 was y i+1 := ϕ i+1 (+, x i+1 ), and we see that y i+1 = x i+2 ⊕ y i ⊕ x i+1 is the xor of three values in the history H, contradicting the assumption that Bad does not happen. If this was a pair of random backward assignments, the value freshly taken from ϕ i+1 was x i+1 := ϕ i+1 (−, y i+1 ), and we see that x i+1 = y i ⊕ y i+1 ⊕ x i+2 is the xor of three values in the history H, contradicting the assumption that Bad does not happen. This concludes the proof of (b).
The proof of (c) is similar to (b) by symmetry. The proof of (d) follows the same lines as the proof of (b) and (c) and is omitted.
We finally show (e). We consider the case of a pair of random forward assignments , x i+1 , i) for some x i+1 because of the assumption that C is table-defined before the pair of assignments. We distinguish two cases depending on i. Assume first that i = 12. Denote (y 0 , x 1 , 0) the chain obtained by a sufficient number of applications of prev to C (possibly none), and k = y 0 ⊕ x 1 . Since C is table-defined before the pair of assignments and val − 12 (C) = y 12 = ⊥, it holds that (+, k, y 0 ) ∈ E and x 1 ∈ P + 1 before the pair of assignments. Denote x 13 = E(+, k, y 0 ). The value freshly taken from ϕ during the pair of forward assignments is y 12 , and we see that y 12 = x 13 ⊕ (y 0 ⊕ x 1 ) is the xor of three values in the history, contradicting the assumption that Bad does not happen. Assume now that i < 12, and denote (y i+1 , x i+2 , i + 1) the chain obtained by a sufficient number of applications of prev to C (possibly none), and k = y i+1 ⊕ x i+2 . Since C is table-defined before the pair of assignments and val − i (C) = y i = ⊥, it holds that y i+1 ∈ P − i+1 and x i+2 ∈ P + i+2 when i < 11, or (−, k, x 13 ) ∈ E when i = 11. Denote x i+1 = P i+1 (−, y i+1 ). Then the value freshly taken from ϕ is y i , and we see that y i = x i+1 ⊕ (y i+1 ⊕ x i+2 ) is the xor of three values in the history, again contradicting the assumption that Bad does not happen. 
Proof. Note that for a good pair (η, ϕ), as long as all calls to ForceVal are non-overwriting, no entries are ever overwritten in table E or in any table P i by Lemma 8 (a). Hence all tables P i define partial permutations (recall that this means that (+, x i ) ∈ P i and P i (+, x i ) = y i if and only if (−, y i ) ∈ P i and P i (−, y i ) = x i ), and E defines a partial cipher (recall that this means that (+, k, x) ∈ E and E(+, k, x) = y if and only if (−, k, y) ∈ E and E(−, k, y) = x). This implies statement (a). The relation ≡ is always reflexive and transitive by definition, and it follows from (a) that it is symmetric (and hence an equivalence relation) for a good pair (η, ϕ) as long as all calls to ForceVal are non-overwriting.
Finally, if C ≡ D, D can be obtained by applying next and prev finitely many times on C. Any shortest such sequence can only consist of applications of next or prev because of (a). Assume that a shortest sequence consists only of r − 1 (r ≥ 1) applications of next (the reasoning is similar for prev). Then denoting C 1 = C, C 2 = next(C 1 ), . . . , C r = next(C r−1 ), we see that C r = D, and that all partial chains C i are table-defined since next(C i ) = ⊥ and prev(C i ) = ⊥ by (a). This shows (c). Proof. Assume that C ≡ D before the pair of random assignments, and let C 1 , . . . , C r be a sequence whose existence is ensured by Lemma 9 (c). Since no entries are overwritten in E or in any P i during the pair of random assignments by Lemma 8 (a), the same sequence C 1 , . . . , C r shows that C ≡ D after the pair of random assignments.
Assume now that C ≡ D after the pair of random assignments, and again let C 1 , . . . , C r be a sequence whose existence is ensured by Lemma 9 (c). Assume that C 1 = C and C r = D (the reasoning is similar for the case C 1 = D and C r = C). Assume towards a contradiction that before the pair of random assignments, r − 1 applications of next to C do not yield D. It is not possible that this yields a partial chain D = ⊥ distinct from D since this would imply that the pair of random assignments overwrote an entry in a table, which does not happen for a good execution. This means that before the pair of random assignments, there is some j such that next(C j ) = ⊥. Note that it is not possible that C j = C r since C r = D is table-defined before the pair of random assignments. Hence we see that next(next(C j )) = ⊥ after the pair of random assignments, contradicting Lemma 8 (b).
Two table-defined non-equivalent chains C and D may collide at round , meaning that val δ (C) = val δ (D) = ⊥ for δ ∈ {+, −}. However, this cannot happen unexpectedly for a good execution. This is captured by the following lemma. Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that all conditions happen during a pair of random assignments in table P i for two partial chains C and D, some ∈ {1, . . . , 12}, and δ = + (the case δ = − is similar). Denote x i and y i the values involved in the pair of random assignments in P i (we consider indifferently a forward or backward pair of assignments). Assume wlog that val + (C) = ⊥ before the pair of random assignments. First, the fact that val + (C) changes from ⊥ to a different value implies by Lemma 8 (d) that i = − 1 (and hence ≥ 2) and val + i (C) = x i before the pair of random assignments. We write all indexes as functions of i in the remaining of the proof. In particular, we have that before the pair of assignments, val + i+1 (C) = ⊥, and after the pair of assignments, val
We now distinguish two cases depending on val The same reasoning as above shows that one cannot have x i = x i , hence we can assume x i = x i . By condition (3) that D is table-defined after the pair of random assignments, D must be table-defined even before the pair of random assignments we are considering, so that y i−1 ∈ P − i−1 and x i ∈ P + i before the pair of random assignments. This allows us to consider the value y i = P i (+, x i ) and we have y i ∈ P − i before the pair of assignments. Similarly, y i−1 ∈ P − i−1 since C is table-defined after the pair of random assignments. After the pair of random assignments, we have val
, and x i are all in the history H. Hence, independently of whether this is a pair of forward or backward assignment, the value freshly taken from ϕ i (either y i for a pair of forward assignments or x i for a pair of backward assignments) is the xor of five values of the history, a contradiction with the assumption that Bad does not happen.
Having excluded all possibilities, we conclude that the four conditions cannot be simultaneously fulfilled.
We now state some properties of safe calls to Adapt. Proof. We first prove (a). Since x −1 / ∈ P + −1 , a pair of random forward assignments occurs in P −1 , and this cannot lead to x ∈ P + since this would contradict Lemma 8 (b) for the partial chain (y −2 , x −1 , − 2). The reasoning is similar for y , and this shows that the call to ForceVal is non-overwriting.
We then show (b). Consider a chain C which is table-defined before the call to Adapt. Denote B = (y −2 , x −1 , − 2) and A = (y +1 , x +2 , + 1). Note that when the call to Adapt occurs, A ≡ B since A and B are both equivalent to the chain which is being completed. If C is equivalent to A and B before the call to Adapt, then C is equivalent to the chain which is being completed since ≡ is an equivalence relation by Lemma 9 (b). Assume now that C is not equivalent to A and B. We show that for any i ∈ {1, . . . , 12}, val (1) before the pair of assignments, B and C are not equivalent (by assumption); (2) before the pair of assignments, val + (B) = ⊥ since x −1 / ∈ P + −1 ; (3) after the pair of assignments, B and C are both table-defined; (4) after the pair of assignments, val
But this is impossible for a good execution by Lemma 11. Finally, we show (c). Let C and D be two chains which are table-defined before the call to Adapt. Assume that C ≡ D before the call to ForceVal. Let C 1 , . . . , C r be a sequence whose existence is ensured by Lemma 9 (c). Since the call to ForceVal is non-overwriting by (a), the same sequence still implies that C ≡ D after the call to ForceVal. Assume now that C ≡ D after the call to ForceVal. Again, let C 1 , . . . , C r be a sequence whose existence is ensured by Lemma 9 (c). Assume that C 1 = C and C r = D (the reasoning is similar for the case C 1 = D and C r = C). Assume towards a contradiction that before the call to ForceVal, r − 1 applications of next to C do not yield D. It is not possible that this yields a partial chain D = ⊥ distinct from D since the call to ForceVal is non-overwriting by (a). This means that before the pair of random assignments, there is some j such that next(C j ) = ⊥. Note that it is not possible that C j = C r since C r = D is table-defined before the call to Adapt. We can now distinguish two cases. Assume first that C is equivalent to A and B before the call to Adapt. Then D is equivalent to A, B and C after the call to ForceVal, but this implies (since D was already table-defined before the call to Adapt) that D was already equivalent to A and B before the call to Adapt, and hence equivalent to C as well. The remaining case is if C is not equivalent to A and B before the call to Adapt. But then the fact that next(C j ) = ⊥ before the call to ForceVal and next(C j ) = ⊥ after the call implies that some value val + i (C) changes during the call to ForceVal, which contradicts (b).
The following two lemmas will be helpful for the remaining of the reasoning.
Lemma 13.
Consider an execution of D Σ 2 (η,ϕ) with a good pair (η, ϕ) . Assume that at some point, a chain C is dequeued such that C / ∈ Completed and that all calls to Adapt before C is dequeued were safe. Then when C was enqueued, no equivalent chain had been previously enqueued.
Proof. Assume that this is false, and consider a chain C which is dequeued at some point such that C / ∈ Completed, all calls to Adapt before C is dequeued were safe, and at the moment C was enqueued, some chain D equivalent to C had been previously enqueued. Then by Lemmas 10 and 12 (c) and the assumption that all calls to Adapt are safe (and hence all calls to ForceVal are non-overwriting by Lemma 12 (a)) before C is dequeued, C and D remain equivalent until the moment where C is dequeued. Clearly, D has already been dequeued when C is dequeued. Since C was already equivalent to D at that time, we see that either C = (y 0 , x 1 , 0) or C = (y 6 , x 7 , 6), where (y 0 , x 1 ) and (y 6 , x 7 ) are the values returned respectively by EvalBackward(D, 0) and EvalForward(D, 7) at lines 16 and 17 of T , so that C was added to the set Completed upon completion of chain D. This is in contradiction with the assumption that C / ∈ Completed when C is dequeued.
Lemma 14.
Consider an execution of D Σ 2 (η,ϕ) with a good pair (η, ϕ). Assume that at some point, a chain C is dequeued, to be adapted at position , such that C / ∈ Completed. Then if val
when C is dequeued, the resulting call to Adapt is safe.
Proof. Denote Adapt(y −2 , x −1 , y +1 , x +2 , ) the call resulting from the completion of C. We want to show that this call is safe, i.e. x −1 / ∈ P + −1 and y +1 / ∈ P − +1 before the call. We show this for x −1 (the reasoning is similar for y +1 ). Assume first that val Proof. We consider only the case = 4, the case = 9 is similar by symmetry. Consider first the case that C = (y 0 , x 1 , 0) is enqueued due to a call to InQuery(2, +, x 2 ). Then clearly before the pair of random assignments triggered by this call, val . Assume now that val − 5 (C) = ⊥ before the call, and denote y 7 = val − 7 (C), x 7 = P 7 (−, y 7 ), y 6 = val − 6 (C), and x 6 = P 6 (−, y 6 ). Then necessarily (y 6 , x 7 , 6) ≡ C has been previously enqueued due to a call to InQuery with one of the four following tuple of arguments: (6, +, x 6 ), (6, −, y 6 ), (7, +, x 7 ), or (7, −, y 7 ). This contradicts the assumption that no equivalent chain has been previously enqueued.
Consider now the case that C = (y 6 , x 7 , 6) is enqueued due to call to InQuery(6, +, x 6 ). Then before the pair of random assignments triggered by this call, it holds that val − 5 (C) = ⊥ since otherwise entry P 6 (−1, y 6 ) would be overwritten, contradicting Lemma 8 (a). Assume now that val + 3 (C) = ⊥ before the call. Denote k = y 6 ⊕ x 7 . Defining x i = val + i (C) for i = 11, 12, 13, 1, and 2, we have that all these values must be different from ⊥ since otherwise val + 3 (C) = ⊥, and moreover all the following entries are set in the respective tables: P 11 (+, x 11 ) = y 11 , P 12 (+, x 12 ) = y 12 , E(−, k, x 13 ) = y 0 , P 1 (+, x 1 ) = y 1 , and = P 2 (+, x 2 ) = y 2 , as well as the corresponding inverse entries P 11 (−, y 11 ) = x 11 , . . . , P 2 (−, y 2 ) = x 2 . Consider the last pair of assignments to a table before all these values are defined. This cannot have been a pair of assignments to E, P 1 or P 12 since otherwise val + 3 (y 11 , x 12 , 11) would change from ⊥ to some value = ⊥ during the pair of assignments, contradicting Lemma 8 (d). This cannot have been a pair of random backward assignments to P 2 or a pair of random forward assignments to P 11 . Indeed, in the first case, val + 3 (y 0 , x 1 , 0) would change during the pair of assignments, while in the second case val − 10 (y 12 , x 13 , 12) would change during the pair of assignments, contradicting Lemma 8 (e). The only remaining possibilities are a pair of random forward assignments to P 2 or a pair of random backward assignments to P 11 , so that the simulator would have detected and enqueued (y 0 , x 1 , 0) ≡ C, a contradiction.
Finally, assume that C = (y 6 , x 7 , 6) is enqueued due to a call to InQuery(6, −, y 6 ). Then clearly before the pair of random assignments triggered by this call, val Proof. Assume that this is false, and consider the first call to Adapt which is not safe. Let C be the chain during completion of which this call to Adapt occurs. Then clearly C / ∈ Completed when C is dequeued, which implies by Lemma 13 that when C was enqueued, no equivalent chain had been previously enqueued (for this, note that all calls to Adapt before C is dequeued were safe by assumption that we are considering the first call which is not safe). Hence, Lemma 15 implies that before the call to InQuery which led to C being enqueued, val + −1 (C) = ⊥ and val − +1 (C) = ⊥. We show that when C is dequeued, one has val
+1 . This will imply the result by Lemma 14. Assume on the contrary that val + −1 (C) ∈ P + −1 when C is dequeued (the reasoning is similar for val − +1 (C)). This implies in particular that val + −1 (C) changed from ⊥ to some value = ⊥ after C was enqueued. Consider the last pair of assignments to a table before val + −1 (C) = ⊥ holds. We show that immediately after this pair of assignments, val
For this, we exclude all possibilities. First, this cannot have been a pair of random assignments to E or some P i by Lemma 8 (d) since C is table-defined after this pair of assignments. Second, this cannot have been a previous call to ForceVal: indeed, C cannot be equivalent to the chain which is being completed when this call to ForceVal occurs (since when C is enqueued, no equivalent chain has been previously enqueued), so that by Lemma 12 (b), val δ i (C) remains constant for all i and δ.
Denote x −1 the value of val + −1 (C) immediately after val + −1 (C) = ⊥ holds. Since x −1 / ∈ P + −1 immediately after val + −1 (C) = ⊥ holds, and x −1 ∈ P + −1 when C is dequeued, this necessarily means that this value was added in P −1 during completion of another chain D. This chain D was enqueued before C was enqueued, and dequeued before C was dequeued, and while D was completed, a pair of random assignments added (+, x −1 ) to P −1 . Note that this cannot have been a pair of random backward assignments, since otherwise val + (C) would change during the pair of assignments, contradicting Lemma 8 (e). Hence this was a pair of random forward assignments, and at the time this pair of assignments occurs, val (1) Before the pair of assignments, C and D are not equivalent. Indeed, when C is enqueued, no equivalent chain has been previously enqueued, and D cannot become equivalent to C later by Lemmas 10 and 12 (c). Yet Lemma 11 exactly forbids that these conditions be simultaneously fulfilled for a good pair (η, ϕ).
Finally, this cannot have been because of a previous call to ForceVal by the same reasoning as before: C cannot be equivalent to the chain which is being completed when this call to ForceVal occurs (since when C is enqueued, no equivalent chain has been previously enqueued), so that by Lemma 12 (b) val δ i (C) remains constant for all i and δ. The same reasoning shows that val δ i (D) cannot change during a previous call to ForceVal. We have excluded all possibilities, which shows that val + −1 (C) / ∈ P + −1 when C is dequeued. This concludes the proof.
We are now ready to state the ultimate goal of this section, which is the following crucial lemma. Proof. This is an immediate consequence of Lemmas 12 (a) and 16.
Randomness Mapping
This section contains the final argument for proving the indistinguishability of the two systems Σ 2 (η, ϕ) and Σ 3 (π).
For any distinguisher D, we define the distinguisher D which runs D and then emulates a call to EvalForward(x, x ⊕ k, 0, 13) (resp. EvalBackward(k ⊕ y, y, 12, 0)) for all queries F.Enc(k, x) (resp. F.Dec(k, y)) made by D, and outputs whatever D outputs. We say that D is the distinguisher which completes all chains corresponding to D. Note that D makes at most 13q queries if D makes at mostueries, and that D has exactly the same advantage as D in distinguishing Σ 2 from Σ 3 .
Recall that the definition of a good pair (η, ϕ) holds with respect to some fixed distinguisher. In all the following, when we mention a good pair (η, ϕ), this always means with respect to D.
We first state two simple lemmas regarding an execution of D Σ 2 (η,ϕ) with a good pair (η, ϕ). 
We consider the case of a query to F.Enc(k, x) (the case of a query to Dec is handled similarly). Assume first that the query was made by the simulator. Then this was while completing a chain, and clearly the equality holds right after completion of the chain. Since no entry is ever overwritten in tables E or P i for a good pair (η, ϕ), the equality also holds at the end of the execution.
Assume now that the query was made by the distinguisher D. Since it completes all chains, at some point in the execution it must emulate a call to EvalForward(x, x ⊕ k, 0, 13). In particular it must query the corresponding values (6, +, x 6 ) and (7, +, x 7 ) at some point. Denote y 6 and y 7 the corresponding answers. Then at the end of the execution we necessarily have that P 6 (+, x 6 ), P 6 (−, y 6 ), P 7 (+, x 7 ), and P 7 (−, y 7 ) are all defined in the respective hash tables. Thus, the partial chain (y 6 , x 7 , 6) was necessarily enqueued at some point, and dequeued later, and hence completed at some point. As previously, the equality holds right after the completion, and also at the end of the execution. Proof. Since no entry is overwritten in table E, the number of queries to η is exactly half the number of entries in E at the end of the execution. We describe a bijective mapping between calls to ForceVal and pairs of entries in E. Namely, to each call to ForceVal we associate the unique entry in E (and its corresponding inverse entry) that was read during during the call to EvalForward or EvalBackward just preceding the call to ForceVal. This mapping in one-to-one: indeed if for two distinct calls to ForceVal the same pair of entries is read, necessarily the second call to ForceVal overwrites an entry, contradicting Lemma 17. This mapping is also onto: for each pair of entries in E we can identify a corresponding call to ForceVal. If the pair of entries was added due to a query to Enc/Dec made by the simulator, then we consider the call to ForceVal immediately following this query. If the pair of entries was added due to a query to Enc/Dec made by D, then the distinguisher will eventually emulate EvalForward or EvalBackward for the corresponding query, querying (or getting as answer) values y 6 and x 7 . At the end of the emulation, consider the first chain which was enqueued during the execution and which was equivalent to (y 6 , x 7 , 6) when it was enqueued. Then the pair of entries in E was read just before the call to Adapt made while completing this chain. Proof. Note that for a good pair (η, ϕ), Λ(η, ϕ) is equal by definition to tables (P 1 , . . . , P 12 ) completed with symbols * for entries which are left undefined at the end of the execution of D Σ 2 (η,ϕ) . Hence the result immediately follows from the fact that for a good pair (η, ϕ), no entry is ever overwritten in tables P i (Lemmas 8 (a) and 17).
In the following, we say that a sequence of partial permutation tables π is good if there exists a good pair (η, ϕ) such that Λ(η, ϕ) = π . For a good π , we let |π i | denote half the number of entries different from * in table π i , and we let |π | = |π 1 | + . . . + |π 12 |. Proof. We start by showing (a). Assume that (i) holds, i.e. consider a good pair (η, ϕ) such that Λ(η, ϕ) = π . We show that (ii) holds. For this, we fix some π ∼ = π , and we proceed by induction on the sequence of queries of D ∪ T to (F(η), ϕ) or ( C 12 (π), π). Assume that the sequence of queries and answers is the same in both systems up to some point in the execution, and consider the next query (which is the same in both systems since D and T are both deterministic). Consider first the case of a query to ϕ i (δ, z)/π i (δ, z). Then the answer is the same in both systems by definition of the mapping Λ. Consider now the case of a query to F.Enc(k, x)/ C 12 .Enc(k, x) (the case of a query to Dec is handled similarly). By Lemma 18, the answer to this query in the execution of D Σ 2 (η,ϕ) is exactly what is obtained when evaluating the Even-Mansour construction forward at the end of the execution. Each answer to calls P i (+, x i ) in this evaluation was set either by a call to ϕ i (+, x i ), or a call ϕ i (−, y i ) which returned x i , or during a call to ForceVal. In all cases the value of π i (+, x i ) must agree by definition of the randomness mapping and by the fact that no entry is overwritten for a good (η, ϕ). Hence, the answer to the query to C 12 .Enc(k, x) is the same in D Σ 3 (π) . Finally, it remains to consider queries to Check. For these queries, it is clear that the answer is the same in both systems since it is determined by previous queries and answers to Enc and Dec.
We then show that (ii) implies (iii). Assume that property (ii) holds for (η, ϕ). By assumption, (η , ϕ ) is good and Λ(η , ϕ ) = π , so that property (ii) holds for (η , ϕ ) by what was just proved above. The result then easily follows since the answer to any query to ϕ/ϕ must agree with π , while the answer to any query to η/η must agree with the answer returned by C 12 (π ).
Finally, we show that (iii) implies (i). Since (η , ϕ ) is good by assumption, assuming that the sequences of queries and answers to (η, ϕ) and to (η , ϕ ) are the same implies that (η, ϕ) is good as well. Moreover, this also implies that Λ(η, ϕ) = Λ(η , ϕ ) = π .
We then show (b). Let (η, ϕ) be a good pair such that Λ(η, ϕ) = π and π such that π ∼ = π . Because of (a), we know that the sequence of queries and answers of D ∪ T is the same in D Σ 2 (η,ϕ) and D Σ 3 (π) . This clearly implies that the sequence of queries and answers of D alone is the same in both systems, and hence also its output. Finally, it remains to show (c). Since the total number of queries of D is at most 13q, it follows from Lemma 2 that the size of P Combining all previous inequalities, we finally obtain that:
ε ≤ (12 × 6 × (13q) 2 ) 2 2 n + 2 × 2 43 × (13q) 12 2 n ≤ 2 89 × q 12 2 n , which concludes the proof.
From the Third to the Fourth System
Finally, we upper bound the distance between systems Σ 3 (π) and Σ 4 .
Lemma 24. For any distinguisher D which makes at mostueries in total, we have:
Proof. First, note that because of Lemma 23, the distinguisher must eventually output an answer when interacting with Σ 3 (π) with probability at least 1−2 89 ×q 12 /2 n . Suppose now that in system Σ 3 (π), T (π) eventually answers a query Query(i, δ, z) asked by the distinguisher. Then necessarily the answer is π i (δ, z). Indeed, T sets this value either by accessing directly π i (δ, z), in which case the claim is clear, or during a call to ForceVal. In the later case, the answer is obtained by evaluating the Even-Mansour construction forward or backward, wrapping up with a call to C 12 (π).Enc or C 12 (π).Dec. Since C 12 uses tables π i as well, the answer to query Query(i, δ, z) must be π i (δ, z) as well. Consequently, for any π such that D Σ 3 (π) eventually outputs an answer, D Σ 4 returns the same answer when the random permutations P i in Σ 4 take their randomness in tables π i . This implies the result.
−1 7 (y 7 )). It simply draws the first three answers y 3 , y 4 and y 5 uniformly at random. Moreover, after query P 5 (x 5 ), it detects and enqueues the partial chain (y 4 , x 5 , 4, 6), and dequeues it immediately, internally setting permutation values that are irrelevant to the analysis. Then, it defines answers x 2 , . . . , x 7 to subsequent queries uniformly at random. After the last query P −1 7 (y 7 ), it detects and enqueues (y 0 , x 1 , 0, 6), and dequeues it immediately. When completing this chain, the simulator internally defines x 4 := y 3 ⊕k , draws y 4 ← $ {0, 1} n , sets P 4 (x 4 ) := y 4 , and enqueues the partial chain (y 4 , x 5 , 4, 3) . It then resumes completion of chain (y 0 , x 1 , 0, 6) by defining x 5 := y 4 ⊕ k , draws y 5 ← $ {0, 1} n , sets P 5 (x 5 ) := y 5 , and enqueues (y 4 , x 5 , 4, 6) (as well as (y 4 , x 5 , 4, 6), but this chain is equivalent to the chain being completed and does not play any role in the analysis). It then finishes to complete (y 0 , x 1 , 0, 6), and continues dequeuing partial chains. Denote D = (y 4 , x 5 , 4) and C = (y 4 , x 5 , 4). At this point, we note that val In the following, we denote y 3 this common value val Hence we see that the analogue of Lemma 12 (b) does not hold.
We stress that we do not know whether the simulator adapted for eight rounds can be attacked, we just pointed out which difficulties arise when trying to straightforwardly transpose the proof. The situation for the Feistel construction is quite different. Indeed, in that case, when removing the four buffer rounds in order to adapt the simulator of [HKT11] for fourteen rounds to ten rounds, there is actually an attack [Seu11] . For the iterated Even-Mansour cipher, it remains an open problem to either modify the distinguisher described above to obtain a real attack (e.g. by having the simulator overwrite a value at some point), showing that this simulator cannot be used to prove indifferentiability for eight rounds, or to find a more complex proof circumventing this difficulty. 
